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Abctract. This study examined the nature of the interactions between fragility and 
macroeconomic outcomes in ECOWAS. This is despite the backdrop of evidences showing 
that macroeconomic policies sufficiently drive macroeconomic outcomes. Meanwhile sub-
Saharan African countries have taken the backbench on almost any standard measures of 
macroeconomic performance within the last two decades. Contemporaneously, the region 
dominates the top 50 percentiles of ranking on almost all dimension and indicators of 
fragility.  Using a panel data for the 15 countries covering the period between 1995-2016 and 
employing the Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) estimation techniques, the findings 
from this work show that the seven macroeconomic outcomes used in the study respond to 
fragility negatively and that fragility accounts for major sources of shocks in these 
economies. The study recommends that ECOWAS should employ a formidable approach to 
blocking this distortion called fragility.  
Keywords. Panel VAR, Shocks, Resource Curse, Sub-Saharan Africa, ECOWAS. 
JEL. F41, I31, O11. 
 
1. Introduction  
rguments within the spheres of economic discus have it that, 
macroeconomic outcomes in developing economies results from 
manipulation of macroeconomic policies. The Washington 
consensus is foremost for such propositions, Williamson (2000), Stiglitz 
(2005). This position is not without empirical justification as the connection 
between macroeconomic performance and outcomes are somewhat 
established, Easterly (2005). However, this proposition becomes 
contentious especially as sub-Saharan African countries have taken the 
backbench on almost any standard measures of macroeconomic 
performance within the last two decades. Contemporaneously, the region 
dominates the top 50 percentiles of ranking on almost all dimension and 
indicators of fragility. These ambiguities call for the need to examine the 
drivers of this relationship. Meanwhile, mainstream economic thinking 
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posits that macroeconomic outcomes are a result of the path of factor 
accumulation (Solow, 1956), human and physical capital development 
(Romer, 1986), technical progress and innovation (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; 
Romer, 1990), and more recently, economic policy and institutions 
(Easterly, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005), these factors still do 
not completely explain the differences in economic performance around the 
world; as instances abound of countries that have satisfied the theoretical 
conditions for favourable macroeconomic outcomes and yet have recorded 
disappointing results. This suggests that there could be other deep 
underlying factors that may matter, perhaps even more, for understanding 
economic performance, particularly for a region with dynamic and 
evolving political systems. Secondly, given that the channels of 
transmission from state fragility situations to the macro economy could be 
multifaceted and interconnected, it is important to identify the most 
significant channels of transmission in other to properly manage and 
concentrate domestic and international interventions to fragile states 
around those mediating channels.   
The worldwide concern about fragility and the challenges it poses to the 
general welfare of humanity and socio-economic development is borne out 
of the key role of states in the international political and economic system. 
Fragility anywhere, whether permanent, or temporary localized (national 
or sub-regional) or widespread, will adversely impact the functioning of 
the international political and economic systems as it compromises the role 
of countries in development, management of shared and scarce global 
resources and in collective national and international human security. 
Development discourse focusing on fragility only gained prominence 
within the last two and half decades ago. Myriads of definitions have been 
coined by development practitioners to capture the multifaceted and 
dynamic nature of the discourse.  Camack et al., (2006), observed the term 
fragility is replaced and comes with different wording, “failed”, “failing”, 
“crisis”, “weak”, “rogue”, “collapsed”, “poorly performed”, “ineffective or 
shadow”, each with its own specific manifestation. 
Rocha et al., (2008) noted that fragility can be entrenched or transitory 
and thus poses challenges of different magnitudes from socio-economic 
perspective. Thus no one situation or form of fragility can describe fragility 
in a country, Menacol (2010). Bertocchi & Guerzoni (2011) were exhaustive 
in their explanation of fragility, as the condition associated with various 
combinations of the following dysfunctions; inability to provide basic 
services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, persistence 
and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control and high propensity to 
conflict and civil war. Fragility is particularly relevant and pronounced in 
those areas of the world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, where it appears to be 
specifically far-reaching. Sub-Saharan African countries are over 
represented among fragile states, with drastic consequences for their 
eligibility for substantial aid flow and for their growth prospect, Bertocchi 
& Guerzoni (2011). The European Report on Development (2009) and 
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Marshal & Cole (2009) showed that sub Saharan African is one of the 
regions in the world that eloquently reflects characteristics of state fragility. 
Out of a total of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 22, representing 46% 
have been classified as fragile, having been characterized by; weak 
government, insufficient security and legal framework, ineffective 
administration, poor public services, high rates of conflicts and civil wars, 
growing extreme poverty. The African Development Banks 2012 Thematic 
Review has it that state fragility matter because around a third of African 
countries, home to 200 million people can be classified as fragile and are 
home to a growing share of Africa’s poor that are susceptible to instability 
with potential consequences beyond their borders. Conflicts and fragility 
are among the most important constraints on Africa’s development. 
There is increasing evidence on the persistent character of the 
phenomenon of state fragility. In fact, the probability that a country that 
was classified as fragile in the year 2001 remains in the same category in 
2009 is 0.95. Accordingly, the 35 countries that were qualified as fragile by 
the World Bank in 1979 still had the same fragile quality in 2009 (European 
Report on Development, 2009). As shown by Andrimihaja et al., (2011), 
beside the common characteristic of weak economic growth among fragile 
states in comparison to non-fragile states, the former states appear to be 
engulfed in a “fragility trap”. The results show a substantial qualitative 
difference between the former and the latter states. In fact, the glaring 
difference is the possibility of falling into a trap of inferior equilibrium: a 
country reflecting characteristics of a fragile state is susceptible of being 
engulfed in a vicious cycle of weak investment, feeble growth and poverty. 
Hence, it could be inferred from the highlighted consequences of state-
fragility that, African countries which are already suffering from a plethora 
of economic woes are paying the hard price (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Sachs 
& Warner, 1997). 
A sustainable blow is being dealt by the phenomenon of fragility on 
most economies of the work, the sub-Saharan African region inclusive. The 
worrisome nature of this phenomenon and its consequences on sustainable 
development in Africa, and West Africa in particular, has made it attract a 
searchlight at both local and international level. In fact the European 
Report, 2009, is entirely focused on ending fragility in Africa. Earlier works 
have described the endogenous relationship between fragility and growth, 
Vailling & Moreno-Torres (2005). Maier (2010), argues as a consequence to 
the neoclassical growth theory, fragility does not allow for sufficient levels 
of human and physical capital required to fuel economic growth. Cilliers & 
Sisk (2013), in their discussion on long term state fragility identify high 
levels of income inequality and the related skewness in allocation of 
benefits and resources along ethnic/tribal and geographic entities, as key 
distinguishing characteristics of fragile state. However, studies reviewed in 
the the IMF 2014, shows that, getting out of fragility and building resilience 
is strongly associated with economic reforms and sound macroeconomic 
policies. This position is in contrast with earlier assertion that ambiguities 
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surround the fragility-macroeconomic outcomes relationship. It is in a 
quest to establish the association between these duos, that this work finds 
premise.   
Having laid the foundation of this work in this section, the next section 
looks at the theoretical, empirical and methodological reviews of literatures 
on fragility. Section three presents the theoretical and empirical framework 
of the study, which includes the data description and estimation methods 
and models. The penultimate section gives the quantitative investigation 
and results while in the last section makes remarks about the findings and 
conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review  
Developing specific theories of fragility is still a difficult task in research. 
Earlier works have relied on explanations of its emergence which have 
been advanced within a widely interdisciplinary, often non-quantitative 
literature. However, this work will extract a set of hypotheses that can 
guide empirical investigation, generate testable implications, and offer an 
interpretation of the resulting evidence. The literature here is reviewed in 
terms of theories and empirics/methodology that are germane to the theme 
of discussion.  
 
2.1. Theoretical review 
2.1.1. Resource curse theory 
The resource curse theory as posited by Karl (2005), in its narrowest 
form, says that resource-rich countries experience negative economic 
growth rates. Resource curse is the negative relation between natural 
resources dependence and economic growth rate of a country. Countries 
that depend on oil revenue for their survival are the most economically 
troubled, the most authoritarian and the most conflict- ridden in the world. 
De Soysa (1999) argues that being 25% dependent on oil for government 
revenues leads a state to be four times more likely to be engaged in a 
conflict. For Karl (2005), the development level of oil exporter countries has 
been negative for the past 40 years. When compared to other countries, 
mineral and oil exporting countries suffer from high poverty, poor 
economic performance, poor health care, widespread malnutrition, poor 
educational performance and low life expectancy. Sachs & Warner (1997) 
selected ninety five developing countries as a sample and they tried to find 
the relationship between natural resources based export and national 
growth in the period between 1970 and 1990. They found that only two 
countries, Malaysia and Mauritius, could sustain 2% per annum growth 
during this period. They concluded their study by arguing the results that 
extremely resource- abundant countries such as oil states in the Gulf, 
Mexico and Venezuela have not experienced sustain rapid economic 
growth (Sachs & Warner, 1997).  
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2.1.2. Social contract theory  
Emerging today is a view of the social contract as a process of sustaining 
equilibrium between the expectations and obligations of the institutions in 
power and those of the rest of society (Lessnoff, 1990). The social contract 
remains valid and legitimate, if the extent to which it creates and maintains 
equilibrium between society’s expectations and obligations and those of 
state authority and institutions, is discernible, otherwise the state fails. The 
social contract theory explains the processes by which everyone in a 
political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to the state 
authority, thereby limiting some of her or his freedom, in exchange for the 
state’s protection of their universal human rights and security and for the 
adequate provisions of public goods and services. This agreements calls for 
individuals to comply with the state’s laws, rules, and practices in pursuit 
of broader common goals, such as security or protection, and basic services. 
The social contract emerges from the interaction between: expectations that 
a given society has of a given state; state capacity to provide services, 
including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory 
to provide these services (in part a function of economic resources; andélite 
will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfill social expectations. It is 
crucially mediated by, the existence of political processes through which 
the bargain between state and society is struck, reinforced and 
institutionalized and legitimacy, which plays a complex additional role in 
shaping expectations and facilitating political process (OECD, 2008: 17). 
Jones et al., (2008), OECD (2011) describe a fragile setting as one  lacking 
effective political processes that can bring state capacities and social 
expectations into equilibrium.  In the lexicons of policy, fragility refers to 
badly disordered political arrangements and weak state legitimacy. In such 
circumstances, public authorities cannot deliver services or collect public 
revenues. Hence, the state and society are not bound in mutually 
reinforcing ways. If there are external or internal shocks, political 
communities are unable to renegotiate their social contract, then conflict 
can occur and public authorities may lose the monopoly on legitimate 
violence. The absence of a social contract is therefore at the heart of 
fragility. 
2.1.3. The bad Neighbours Hypothesis 
There are several channels by which fragile states exert an influence on 
their neighbours macroeconomic outcomes. Although fragility does not 
appear to be contagious, it does lead to the diffusion of political instability 
to neighbouring states. A typical example is the Liberian experience, where 
President Charles Taylor provided mercenaries, money, weapons and 
infrastructure to rebel groups in Sierra Leone with the objective of gaining 
control over regional diamond mines and economic networks, Iqbal & 
Starr, (2008). Further, there are also macroeconomic implications of the 
movement of refugees to neighbouring countries as a result of fragility. In 
addition to its potential for being an incubation ground for violent groups 
and crime, refugee movements create pressure on health and education 
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infrastructure through the spread of diseases, e.g., malaria and AIDS, and 
the overpopulation of schools. For example, there is evidence that the 
refugee movements from Burundi and Rwanda to Tanzania have exacted 
heavy consequences on the health and school participation in the Kagera 
region. These effects are very likely to be passed on to the macroeconomic 
performance of the county. Empirical evidence shows that an estimated 80 
percent of the cost of fragility is borne by neighbouring countries, with the 
bad-neighbours effect estimated at about 0.6 percent of lost output growth 
per neighbour see Chauvet, Collier, & Hoefler (2011), and European Report 
(2009).  
2.1.4. Growth theory 
Growth theories from the classical to the neo-classical, assumes that 
growth is fundamentally and positively related or linked with capital 
accumulation, labour productivity (population) and the level of technology. 
Among their assumptions is that therate of technological progress is 
determined by a scientific process that is separate from and independent of, 
economic forces. The submitted that a economy recovers quickly and 
automatically in case of displacement and converges to the steady growth 
rate. Implicit in their proposition is that long run growth rate is exogenous. 
The neoclassical created a lacuna, as no explicit mention is made about 
factors that cause negative growth or displaces the economy from the 
steady growth rate.  
The endogenous growth model and other theories that followed 
explained the dynamics of growth and economic performance adding 
factors hitherto not included in the neoclassical. Among which were, the 
variations in the stock of natural resources, Sachs & Warner (1995, 1999), 
and the stock of social capital which includes education, Acemoglu et al., 
(2002), Auty (2001). Gylfason (2011) broke down these into six categories – 
real capital, human capital, foreign capital, social capital, financial capital 
and natural capital. A submission of this theory is that a economy does not 
recover automatically, it has to be driven internally to converge. They 
explained further this convergence does not happen instantaneously; rather 
it takes a longer time. Their prediction is that an economy converges to 
their steady with the speed of convergence depending on the distance from 
the steady state.  Barro & Sala-i- Martin (2004) also predicts that the speed 
of convergence depends on the type of capital that is destroyed with slower 
recovery if human capital rather than physical capital is destroyed, because 
it has a higher adjustment cost. The poverty trap model predicts that 
conflicts has a direct effects on a economy steady state and as a result 
similar economies do not converge Azariadis & Drazen (1990), Rodrik 
(1999) Collier (1999). In a bid to confirm this, Barro (1991) incorporated two 
measures of political instability into the growth model. Both of these, the 
number of revolutions and or coups per year Barro & Wolf (1989), and the 
number of political assassinations per million populations negatively affect 
growth.  He explained that both of these variables distort property rights 
and thereby hampers investment and decrease growth. In line with this 
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proposition by Barro & Wolf (1989), Barro (1991) the work intends to add to 
the growth model a variable whose variant, political instability has shown 
a negative impact on growth; fragility. 
 
2.2. Empirical/methodological review 
Brinkerhoff, Vailling & Moreno-Torres (2005), point out that the root 
causes of fragility includes factors such as, past armed conflict, poor 
governance, political instability, militarization, an ethnically and socially 
heterogeneous and polarized population, weak or declining economic 
performance, demographic stress, low level of human development, 
environment stress and bad neighbors. In line with this position Chauvet et 
al., (2007) have evidenced neighboring countries are closely affected by the 
cost of failing state. On average, countries neighboring fragile state loose 
around 0.6% of growth per year, but if all neighbors of the country are 
fragile state the figure rises to 1.0% per year. 
Nkurunziza (2017) posited that political fragility induces low capital 
accumulation. Countries with the most emblematic wars in Africa 
including Algeria in 1990s, Angola from the 1970s to near 2000s, Burundi in 
1990s, the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1990s and 2000s, Mozambique 
in the 1970s and 1980s and Uganda in the 1980s post very low, mostly 
negatively rate of capital accumulation during the period of political 
fragility. Landregan & Poole (1990), Barro (1991) Barro & Lee (1993), 
Easterly et al., (1993), Easterly & Rebelo (1993), Persson & Tabellini (2006) 
all found that government and social instability and political violence often 
affect economic performance. Knack & Keefer (1995) and Easterly & Levine 
(1997), confirmed that revolutions inhibit economic performance. 
Following the same trend Alesina & Perrotti (1996) confirmed that political 
violence (assassination, death from political violence, coups and a 
dictatorship dummy) reduces economic performance. In recent line of 
literature Jong & Pin (2009) find that only the instability of political regime 
has a robust and significant effect on growth. Organski & Collier (1977) 
presented evidence on catch up. They found out that the effect on countries 
that suffered from the losses of the civil war, dissipated after 15-20 years 
when the countries had returned to pre-war growth trends. Murdock & 
Sandler (2004) found that civil war reduces a countries growth by 85% in 
the first 5years and while there is recovery, growth is still reduced to 31% 
after 35 years. Rodrik (1999) argued that growth rates have lacked 
persistence in, many countries since the 1970s because of domestic conflicts. 
Collier (1995) lays out how civil wars reduce the desired stock of factors of 
production and how the direction of civil war affects post war 
performances.  
Wolf, (2005), argues fragility affects macroeconomic outcomes through 
the investment channels; both physical and human capital investments, and 
domestic and foreign investments. Apart from the fact that state fragility 
reduces the volume of investments, especially FDI, it also affects the 
composition of investments by tilting incentives towards the accumulation 
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of less specialized capital goods, often having lower returns, which can be 
easily divested in response to fragility shocks. European Report (2009), 
added that the associated ease with which these investments could be 
divested or reallocated constitutes, in its self, a source of macroeconomic 
volatility. On the human capital side, state fragility induces reductions in 
the quality and quantity of investments in health and education; it also 
alters the composition of skilled versus unskilled labour, as households 
would rather spend short periods learning different vocations that would 
allow themto cross between sectors in response to fragility shocks, than 
spend several years studying a profession. 
Alemeyahu (2017), using a combination of the Autoregressive 
distributive lag model and the logit and probit model for robust results 
founds out that the workings of macroeconomic policies are not enough in 
fragile state but a combination of a holistic approach which includes, 
inclusive and democratic politics, improving governance and institutional 
improvement are necessities for macroeconomic stabilization in fragile 
state. Chuku & Onye (2007) studied how state fragility conditions affect 
macroeconomic outcomes in sub-Saharan African economies, and identify 
some of the most plausible transmission mechanisms. Applying dynamic 
panel estimation techniques and structural vector autoregressions to data 
on 48 sub-Saharan African economies over the period 1995 to 2014, they 
show that countries with greater fragility suffer higher macroeconomic 
volatility and crisis; they also experience weaker growth. 
Chuku & Onye (2017) studied how state fragility conditions affect 
macroeconomic outcomes, captured by macroeconomic vitalities, crisis and 
performance, in sub-Saharan African economies, and identify some of the 
most plausible transmission mechanisms. They show that countries with 
greater fragility suffer higher macroeconomic volatility and crisis; they also 
experience weaker growth. Conversely Campos et al., (1999) suggest that 
the presence of fragility brings about growth. They argued that fragility can 
force otherwise recalcitrant governments to undertake long-delayed 
reforms. In support of this argument Carment, Samy & Prest (2008) over a 
cross-sectional sample of world countries finds that per capita income is the 
main driver of fragility, with higher income being associated with lower 
fragility.  
 
3. Theoretical framework and research methodology 
3.1. The theoretical framework 
This study leans on the Neo-classical growth theory framework 
developed mainly by Solow (1956), and Barro & Sala-I-Martin (1992). 
Starting with General Cobb-Douglas production function model: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝛽
         (1) 
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the total amount of production of the final good at time t in 
country i, 𝑘𝑖𝑡  is the capital stock at time t in country i, 𝐴𝑖𝑡  is technology at 
time t in country i, and 𝐿𝑖𝑡  is total employment in country i, at time t. 
 Defining 𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
  as the stock of physical capital per unit of effective 
labor, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
  as output per unit of effective labor in country i at time 
t. They derived the following equation: 
 
𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (𝑔 + 𝑛 + 𝛿)       (2) 
 
When g is technological progress of A, n was the growth rate of the 
labor force and δ is depreciation of K. The production function in the 
intensive form could be written as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖𝑡
∝. Then intensive form of steady 
state of capital is; 
 
ln𝐾𝑖
∗ =
1
1−𝛼
ln 𝑆𝑖𝑡 −
1
1−𝛼
ln(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿)      (3) 
 
Substituting the steady state k* we obtained 
 
𝑙𝑛 𝑦∗ = 𝑙𝑛(𝐴𝑖𝑡) + 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑙𝑛 𝑆𝑖 −
𝛼
1−𝛼
𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖 + δ)     (4) 
 
Following Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) for unconditional convergent 
equation will be: 
 
ln𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡       (5) 
 
Since determinants of economic growth differ across countries, Barro 
(1990), Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1992) favor the notion of conditional 
convergence: 
 
ln𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ln 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑥𝑖𝑡+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡       (6) 
 
Where t indicates the time interval, (𝑡 − 1) is the initial of the time 
interval, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the matrix of other variables that can affect economic 
growth, ʋ𝑖𝑡 is error term, and y is real GDP per people.  
 
3.1. Model specification  
In analyzing the impact of fragility on macroeconomic outcomes in 
ECOWAS this work specifies a Eight-Variable Panel Variable Vector 
Autoregressive Model. The panel vector auto-regression (PVAR) 
methodology joins the panel data approach with the traditional VAR 
method (Love & Zicchino, 2006). There are three major advantages of the 
PVAR method: firstly, this method makes a flexible framework that 
combines the traditional VAR approach with panel data and increases the 
efficiency and the power of analysis while capturing both temporal and 
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contemporaneous relationship among variables (Mishkin & Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2007). Secondly, the PVAR method can takes into account complex 
relationship and identifies dynamics responses of variables following 
exogenous shocks using both impulse response functions and 
Variance decompositions. In that way, it provides a systematic way of 
capturing the rich dynamic structures and co-movements between different 
variables over time (Omojolaibi et al., 2014). Thirdly, traditional VAR 
approach treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, while the 
PVAR technique allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity and can 
tackle the data limitation problems (Kandil et al., 2015). 
The model for this work follows the Bertocchi & Canova (2002) and 
Bertocchi & Canova (2011), who adopted the Standard Barro Regression 
Equation to analyses the impact of colonization  on growth (2002) and 
fragility on growth (2011), (see also King & Levine, 2007 and Rousseau & 
Watchel , 2007) .  
 
Yit = βXit + γFRit +μit         (7) 
 
Where1ȳitis the growth rate of real per capita GDP, FRit is a index of 
fragility and Xit is a set of baseline explanatory variables that have been 
shown empirically to be robust determinants of growth. In this work the X 
variables include the log of initial real per capita GDP, which should 
capture the tendency for growth rates to converge across countries and 
over time, and the log of the initial secondary school enrollment rate, which 
should reflect the extent of investment in human capital. The following 
variables are included in Xit as macroeconomic outcomes; Trade openness, 
Unemployment rate, Foreign Direct Investment and Inflation Rate.  
The panel VAR model is a s specified below:  
 
Zit ═ A (L)Zit-1 + eit         (8) 
 
Where Zit is a matrix of endogenous variables (A(L) is a matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator, L, with country i = 1…….15 
Following the base line specification above, the explicit form of the 
PVAR is as follows: 
 
GRPGDPit=a0+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 1jGRPGDP1t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 2jFR2t-j+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 3jTROP3t-
j+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 4jINFR4t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 5jFDI5t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 6jUNEMR6t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 7jlnSER7t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 8jlnRPGDP8t-j+𝜇1𝑖𝑡        (9) 
 
FRit=a9+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 10jFR10t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 11jGRPGDP11t-j+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 12jTROP12t-
j+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 13jINFR11t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 14jFDI14t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 15jUNEMR15t-j  + 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 16jlnSER16t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 17jlnRPGDP17t-j+𝜇2𝑖𝑡        (10) 
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TROPit=a18+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 19jTROP19t-1+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 20jGRPGDP20t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 21jFR21t-
j  + 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 22jINFR22t-j+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 23jFDI23t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 24jUNEMR24t-j  + 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 25jlnSER25t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 26jlnRPGDP26t-j+𝜇3𝑖𝑡        (11) 
 
INFRit=a27+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 28jINFR28t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 29jGRPGDP29t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 30jFR30t-j+-
 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 31jTROP31t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 32jFDI32t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 33jUNEMR33t-j  +  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 34jlnSER34t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 35jlnRPGDP35tj+𝜇4𝑖𝑡        (12) 
 
FDIit=a36+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 37jFDI37t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 38jGRPGDP38t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 391jFR39t-j+-
 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 40jTROP40t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 41jINFR41t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 42jUNEMR42t-j +  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 43jlnSER43t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 44jlnRPGDP44tj+𝜇5𝑖𝑡        (13) 
 
UNEMRit=a45+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 46jUNEMR46t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 47jGRPRGDP47t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 48jFR48t-j+-
 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 49jTROP49t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 50jINFR50t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 51jFDI51t-j +  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 52jlnSER52t-
j+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 53jlnRPGDP53tj+𝜇6𝑖𝑡        (14) 
 
lnSERit=a54+  𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 55jlnSER55t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 56jGRPRGDP56t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 57jFR57t-j +-
 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 58jTROP58t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 59jINFR59t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 60jUNEMR60t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 61jFDI61t-j  
+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 62jlnRPGDP62tj+𝜇7𝑖𝑡         (15) 
 
lnRGDPit=a63+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 64jlnRPGDP64t-1+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 65jGRPRGDP65t-j+ 𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 66jFR66t-j+-
 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 67jTROP67t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 68jINFR68t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 69jUNEMR69t-j+  𝑎
𝑛
𝑗=1 70jFDI70t-j 
+ 𝑎𝑛𝑗=1 71jlnSER71t-j +𝜇8𝑖𝑡        (16) 
 
Where; 𝑎0 …𝑎71 are parameters to be to be estimated, (GRPGDP),Growth 
Rate of real per capita GDP 
(𝑅𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃), Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Products, (𝐹𝑅 )Fragility index, 
(TROP),Trade Openness, (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅) ,Inflation Rate,( 𝐹𝐷𝐼 ), Foreign Direct 
Investment, (UNEMR),Unemployment Rate,(SER),School enrolment rate , μ
𝑡
= 
stochastic error term. 
 
3.3. Data requirement and sources 
The data for this study are obtained mainly from secondary sources; 
particularly from World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2016) and 
Center for Systemic Peace, Failed State Index table (2016). 
 
4. Presentation of empirical result 
4.1. Trend analysis 
The figure above shows the behavior of fragility and foreign direct 
investment. Fragility fluctuates and is associated with periods of low, 
medium and high values.  In the above, higher fragility is associated with 
lower foreign direct investment. This description is realistic. Uncertainties, 
which is a feature of fragility drives away investment. Countries with 
higher fragility experience lower inflow of FDI.  
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Figure 1. Trend of Fragility and Foreign Direct Investment 
Note: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
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Figure 2. Trend Analysis of Fragility and Trade Openness 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
Figure 2 shows the behavior of fragility and trade openness. Both 
variables are unstable. Lower fragility index is associated with unstable 
level of trade openness. It can be inferred that, trade openness, which is 
manifested byglobalization and trade liberalization, open doors to fragility.   
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Figure 3. Trend Analysis of Fragility and Unemployment 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
Figure 3, above shows the behavior of fragility and unemployment 
across the ECOWAS countries. The mixed results shows higher fragility is 
associated with higher rate of unemployment in some, others experience 
either lower fragility or higher unemployment rate, and others have a 
higher fragility rate causing them lower unemployment rate. Benin 
republic experiences the first case of this relation. Burkina Faso had the 
opposite of what obtains in Benin republic. Nigeria has a stable 
unemployment rate amidst unstable fragile situations. In Sierra Leone an 
initially increasing fragility is associated with stable unemployment rate, at 
the same time when fragility fell, unemployment remained stable.  
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Figure 4. Trend Analysis of Fragility and Inflation 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
Figure 4 above shows a relatively stable fragility level against a 
fluctuating inflation rate. While fragility remains high, inflation moves 
below it. Guinea Bissau experiences a negative rate of inflation with a 
relatively stable fragility rate. In Cape Verde a falling fragility is associated 
with an unstable rate of inflation. 
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Figure 5. Trend Analysis of Fragility and School Enrolment Rate 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
In Figure 5 above fragility fluctuating behavior leaves school enrolment 
rate relatively stable. This behavior implies that fragility does not hinder 
human capital development. However, this illustration is contestable. 
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Figure 6. Trend Analysis of Fragility and Growth of Per Capita GDP 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
Showing in Figure 6 above is the behavior of fragility and growth rate of 
per capita GDP. While different growth rate of GDP behaves with different 
levels of fragility, Cape Verde happens to be the only country where lower 
fragility behaves with rising real per capita GDP. Liberia experienced at 
some point a higher growth rate per capita of GDP, relative to a rising 
fragility. 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
In the table below the summary descriptive statistics for each of the 
individual variables in the model is presented. The statistics presented 
include the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, Jarque-Bera 
statistic, among others. The data was pooled for the 15 countries in 
ECOWAS, for the period of 1995-2016. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
From the table above there are 304 observations. The average value of 
fragility in the West Africa region, ECOWAS is 15.6. This value shows that 
West African countries on the average are experiences medium fragility. 
The FR has a standard deviation of 9.3. The data on FR also shows that is 
negatively skewed but has a positive kurtosis. The data for some of the 
variables appears to be skewed to the right.  The Jarque-Berra statistic, tests 
the data are from the normal distribution. The null hypothesis is a joint 
hypothesis of the skewness being zero and the excess kurtosis being zero. 
The p-value being zero indicates that the null hypothesis of normal 
distribution is rejected. SER has the lowest average and the lowest standard 
deviation from the observation. However, it is negatively skewed with a 
positive kurtosis. The data with the highest mean is the RPGDP while the 
SER shows the lowest.  
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 GRPGDP FDI FR INFR RPGDP SER TROP UNEMR 
GRPGDP 1        
FDI 0.011142792 1       
FR -0.132780673 0.03172145 1      
INFR 0.07501522 0.06331226 0.0978383 1     
RPGDP 0.184549061 -0.1044835 -0.512809 0.070537971 1    
SER -0.000490446 0.076322 -0.395536 -0.04743060 0.243248557 1   
TROP -0.019584148 0.0921259 -0.18064 0.066918453 0.389696465 0.0111631 1  
UNEMR 0.070819115 -0.1010271 -0.46888 0.030767724 0.433330174 0.2587503 0.214427 1 
Source: Authors’ computation using data from World Development Indicator of the IMF 
(2016) and Center for Systemic Peace (2016). 
 
The correlation matrix shown above has some implications on the extent 
of association between the variable of interest and other variables in the 
model. The degree of association between Fragility and other variables in 
the model is very weak, fair and mixed. A 13% weak and negative 
association exists between FR and GRPGDP. FR and FDI are weakly and 
positively associated with a coefficient of (0.032). A similar association 
exists between FR and INFR as in FDI, with a coefficient of 0.098. However, 
RPGDP and UNEMR both have a moderate and negative association with 
  FDI FR GRPGDP INFR RPGDP SER TROP UNEMR 
 Mean  4.954182  15.56908  1.562044  6.105476  2004.523  0.809694  76.53129  5.949155 
 Median  2.275512  16.00000  1.509975  3.957806  1568.787  0.851368  70.76730  6.800000 
 Maximum  89.47596  24.00000  30.34224  72.83550  6168.285  1.091257  158.3790  11.10200 
 Minimum -1.087801  4.000000 -31.34253 -35.83668  577.6570 -1.30402  29.60148 -0.247361 
 Std. Dev.  9.332246  3.986176  4.907122  10.22511  1277.274  0.267432  26.95447  2.661443 
 Skewness  5.562491 -0.934267 -1.105308  2.156165  1.703525 -4.685345  0.524186  0.092474 
 Kurtosis  43.43612  3.933467  20.02111  14.72230  5.422341  31.61185  2.557636  2.055867 
 Jarque-Bera  22278.71  55.26187  3731.663  1976.107  221.3592  11481.67  16.40041  11.72418 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000275  0.002845 
 Sum  1506.071  4733.000  474.8614  1856.065  609374.9  246.1470  23265.51  1808.543 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  26388.52  4814.549  7296.194  31679.52  4.94E+08  21.67047  220142.6  2146.234 
 Observations  304  304  304  304  304  304  304  304 
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FR, with (-0.51) and (-0.46) respectively. Lastly FR is weakly and negatively 
associated with SER with a coefficient of (-0.39). With this kind of 
association the data is free from multicollinearity.  
4.2.1. Panel VAR analysis 
The table below shows the extracted estimate of the response of all the 
macroeconomic outcomes considered in this to fragility. The details of 
these estimates are in the appendix. 
 
Table 3.  Response of Fragility to Macroeconomic Outcomes 
PERIOD FR FDI GRPGDP INFR RPGDP SER TROP UNEMR 
1  1.026459  0.041309 -0.81705 -0.32771 -13.4031  0.000322  0.206494 -0.03541 
  (0.04292)  (0.34954)  (0.28941)  (0.35893)  (6.16251)  (0.00834)  (0.37062)  (0.05998) 
2  0.957986 -0.26579 -0.14324 -0.26542 -17.0418 -0.00525  0.542585 -0.02922 
  (0.04640)  (0.23980)  (0.11437)  (0.25977)  (7.61574)  (0.00759)  (0.39731)  (0.05972) 
3  0.897086 -0.38903 -0.03787 -0.13739 -18.4192 -0.01033  0.736776 -0.02498 
  (0.05507)  (0.21510)  (0.10334)  (0.23272)  (8.84436)  (0.00765)  (0.44425)  (0.06396) 
4  0.842320 -0.42411 -0.01219 -0.04411 -19.4562 -0.01433  0.900394 -0.02113 
  (0.06524)  (0.21574)  (0.09652)  (0.23244)  (10.3178)  (0.00808)  (0.50520)  (0.07037) 
5  0.791878 -0.41517 -0.00296  0.018963 -20.4345 -0.01732  1.047740 -0.01761 
  (0.07535)  (0.21734)  (0.09071)  (0.23429)  (11.9677)  (0.00857)  (0.57219)  (0.07738) 
6  0.744645 -0.38518  0.000458  0.062034 -21.4206 -0.01946  1.181292 -0.01447 
  (0.08479)  (0.21579)  (0.08595)  (0.23274)  (13.7176)  (0.00901)  (0.64053)  (0.08415) 
7  0.699991 -0.34633  0.001073  0.092098 -22.443 -0.02092  1.301934 -0.01168 
  (0.09337)  (0.21187)  (0.08193)  (0.22818)  (15.5233)  (0.00934)  (0.70781)  (0.09030) 
8  0.657562 -0.30497  0.000230  0.113500 -23.5178 -0.02181  1.410248 -0.00922 
  (0.10101)  (0.20677)  (0.07845)  (0.22186)  (17.3607)  (0.00957)  (0.77276)  (0.09570) 
9  0.617151 -0.2643 -0.00136  0.128936 -24.6548 -0.02226  1.506726 -0.00705 
  (0.10774)  (0.20126)  (0.07535)  (0.21480)  (19.2166)  (0.00970)  (0.83474)  (0.10031) 
10  0.578630 -0.22581 -0.00332  0.140111 -25.8597 -0.02235  1.591807 -0.00512 
  (0.11359)  (0.19578)  (0.07257)  (0.20761)  (21.0837)  (0.00975)  (0.89343)  (0.10415) 
 
Table 3 above shows the responses of macroeconomic variables to 
fragility. Fragility has positive effects on itself, this support the view by 
researchers that fragility is self-reinforcing and once a country enters into 
the fragility trap it takes time to come out. At the initial period fragility 
reinforces itself more than 100%, positively. The rate reduces overtime, 
only to 67% in the tenth period.   
Fragility has 4% positive effects on foreign direct investment in the 
initial period. This is not against what earlier scholars on this discussed 
have posited. This situation is due to the difficulties associated with 
moving their physical capital from the fragile state. The subsequent period, 
particularly by the second period, the response of FDI to fragility turns 
negative. This situation means inflows of foreign owned physical 
businesses will cease. However a total withdrawal of Foreign Direct 
Investment is not shown by the results above, meaning that the stock of 
FDI reduces but not by a 100%. The result above shows 26%, 38%, 42%, 
41%, 38%, 34% reduction from the second to the seventh period 
respectively. The lowest stock of FDI, 19% will be experienced in the 10th 
period. 
Growth rate of per capita GDP, responded to fragility with mixed 
responses. It started with the highest negative response to rate of 81% in the 
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initial period, the negative response remains, though at a lower rate. After a 
while the response changed to positive and later a negative response 
ensued. An explanation for this is the huge share of country’s GDP that 
would have be committed to ending fragility, in whatever manifestation 
comes. Fragility in the form of conflicts will require a country to boost the 
share for security, in the national budget. This explains the situation. The 
response by GRPGDP turns out positive, after the 5th, responding to as low 
as 0.04%. The response further plummeted to a negative 0.3% in the tenth 
period. The argument by Vaillings & Moreno (2005), that a lower rate of 
growth is a consequence and cause of fragility.    
Inflation rate also has mixed responses to fragility.  Initially inflation 
responded negatively to fragility. This means that inflationary situation is 
borne by fragility. Inflation could also be a cause of fragility. Results in the 
variance decomposition lend credence to this. Fragility caused a 32% rise in 
inflation, for the first three periods. It however responded positively after 
the fourth period, reducing a sustained prices rise by 1.8%, 6.2%, 9.2%, 1.1% 
from the fifth period to the eight periods and to 7% in the tenth period.  
The real per capita GDP shows a negative response to fragility 
throughout all the period at a increasing rate. It responded from a negative 
13% in the first period up to 25 % fall in RGDP in the tenth period. Initially 
it responded negatively at a high rate but the rate of negative response 
decreased as the period increases.    
The school enrolment rate experiences a positive response in the first 
period of fragility. A very low positive response of 0.03%, as available on 
the table. This rate decreased consistently after the first period. Fragility in 
the form of social conflict reduces human capital, which is captured, in this 
work by SER. Barro (1991), argued that the ease with which countries 
would converge to the steady state of growth will be determined by the 
nature of loss resulting from conflict or political instability, a longer time if 
human capital is destroyed.  
Trade openness shows positive responses to fragility. Starting a 20% 
positive response initially, 90% positive response in the fourth period, 104 
% response in the fifth period, 130% in the seventh period, 150% positive 
response in the 9th period and 159% positive response in the 10th period. 
This results or response is not without realistic justifications. Trade 
openness is the outcome of globalization and trade liberalization. 
Smuggling of goods and ammunition, international sponsorship of 
terrorism and arms dealing have been accompanied by trade liberalization. 
The data lend credence to this fact. 
Unemployment rate has shown decreasing response to fragility. 
Fragility negatively affects unemployment. This rate according to the 
results in the table continuously initially increased negatively but later fell. 
Depending on the nature of unemployment experienced in the region, 
youth unemployment has been associated with increasing fragility. The 
value was highest in the tenth period, 10%. 
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Figure 7. Impulse Response Function Graph 
 
Table 4. Variance Decomposition of Fragility and Macroeconomic Outcomes 
PERIOD S.Error FR S. Error FDI S. Error GRPGDP S. Error INFR 
1  1.026459  100.0000  5.911315  0.004883  4.928291  2.748530  6.074405  0.291053 
2  1.409664  99.20516  6.837155  0.154772  4.978716  2.775906  7.161924  0.346713 
3  1.681921  98.13564  7.140919  0.438679  4.989419  2.769772  7.528150  0.347105 
4  1.895125  97.05201  7.265499  0.764507  4.993890  2.765411  7.664496  0.338177 
5  2.069571  96.02089  7.331560  1.071458  4.996179  2.762912  7.721695  0.333789 
6  2.215947  95.04666  7.375628  1.331419  4.997711  2.761219  7.750454  0.337722 
7  2.340843  94.11691  7.409488  1.537755  4.998963  2.759841  7.768484  0.350212 
8  2.448722  93.21786  7.437412  1.694373  5.000094  2.758593  7.782148  0.370254 
9  2.542795  92.33871  7.461305  1.809017  5.001160  2.757424  7.793820  0.396514 
10  2.625468  91.47215  7.482256  1.889976  5.002183  2.756341  7.804441  0.427666 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
Table 4. Variance Decomposition of Fragility and Macroeconomic Outcomes (Continues) 
PERIOD S.Error RPGDP S.Error SER S.Error TROP S.Error UNEMR 
1  104.6476  1.640418  0.141093  0.000520  6.269524  0.108479  1.014743  0.121734 
2  161.9196  1.792913  0.183667  0.081956  8.907182  0.424814  1.382796  0.110202 
3  207.4014  1.881492  0.208262  0.309801  10.90194  0.740312  1.633869  0.102314 
4  247.0820  1.945758  0.223911  0.677324  12.56400  1.070981  1.822257  0.095693 
5  283.4810  1.997776  0.234389  1.163926  14.01299  1.419989  1.970075  0.089861 
6  317.8556  2.043193  0.241683  1.743231  15.30880  1.785206  2.089170  0.084701 
7  350.9230  2.085289  0.246948  2.387061  16.48675  2.162822  2.186851  0.080157 
8  383.1347  2.126174  0.250889  3.068305  17.57010  2.548564  2.268031  0.076175 
9  414.7954  2.167278  0.253948  3.762866  18.57534  2.938139  2.336206  0.072705 
10  446.1215  2.209597  0.256405  4.450736  19.51484  3.327401  2.393967  0.069697 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
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Table 4 above shows fragility’s share of theshock related to any of the 
macroeconomic outcomes. The share of fragility in shocks related to it is 
100% in the initial level and falls continuously till the last period.  Shocks 
from FDI are accounted for by fragility initially at 0.4%. At this rate other 
macroeconomic outcomes account for the remainder including FDI. This 
value rises through the last period to 1.88%. Meaning that, shocks to FDI 
starts low with fragility, but is later consumed by the phenomenon. 
GRPGDP is accounted for by 2.74% fragility and remains steady 
throughout the period. Inflation has a steadily increasing rate of share 
accounted for by fragility. RGDP, School enrolment rate and trade 
openness also have increasing share of shock in them resulting from 
fragility. However fragility has a initially high share of shock in UNEMR 
but later falls. 
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Figure 8. Variance Decomposition Graph 
 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
The result of the quantitative investigation carried out in this work 
shows that fragility impacts macro-economy of ECOWAS. Of a high and 
destabilizing implication is this phenomenon on macroeconomic outcomes 
considered in this work such as, inflation, trade openness, foreign direct 
investment, school’s enrolment rate, unemployment rate, growth rate of 
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per capita GDP, and real per capita GDP. This has strong implications on 
the social, political and economic environment of the region. Fragility is self 
reinforcing, from the details of the estimate in the previous chapter, as it 
accounts for more that 100% of itself. This explains the neighborhood 
hypothesis or the spillover implications of the phenomenon to close related 
region, which sends a strong signal to sub-Saharan Africa countries in 
general and ECOWAS states in particular. 
The decreasing inflow of Foreign Direct Investment in the ECOWAS 
states has been empirically confirmed to be in a part the consequences of 
fragility. This decreasing inflow of FDI is meant to increase as the 
phenomenon of fragility persists. The empirical results show a continuous 
decrease or evacuation of foreign physical capital in form of foreign direct 
investment in ECOWAS, state. The findings also shows a consistent decline 
will meet the growth rate of GDP and the per capita real GDP should the 
phenomenon persists. This will cause a substantial fall in the social welfare 
of the people. The declining nature of these variables is also shown by the 
need to spend more on curbing the phenomenon, thereby reducing the 
social beneficial impacts of government expenditure. The ECOWAS policy 
of trade liberalization has shown its negative impact being a driver of 
fragility. Trade openness has being the source of increasing fragile situation 
prevalent in the region.  Trade openness has the highest positive response 
to fragility. It increased from a lowly 20% to a very high value of 150% 
within ten periods. 
The phenomenon of unemployment is also shown to have responded 
well to fragility. This situation has been empirically justified.  The problem 
of youth unemployment in the region could bear a explanation for this. 
Unemployed youth have been the source of manpower for evil minded 
people. Their role in political hooliganism is also a pointer to this empirical 
justification. Sustained rising general price level, inflation rate was 
empirically confirmed to respond to fragility. 
The channels through which the region can attain convergence have 
been empirically proved to be inflicted by fragility. This has a strong 
negative impact on the sustainability of development in the region. This 
work recommends the following: 
The trade liberalization policy of ECOWAS should be thoroughly 
reconsidered. That trade openness which should be a means through which 
countries would exchange growth enhancing resources has turned out to 
be the source of fragility, requires that that aspect of trade openness be 
strongly attended to. ECOWAS state should define items to be traded 
among countries. A formidable authority that would ensure strict 
compliance to the terms of the trade liberalization agreement, established, 
both at constituting state and ECOWAS level. The government of ECOWAS 
state should also censure or monitor all that globalization has to offer.  
ECOWAS should revive her military authority, ECOMOG with full force so 
as to take care of conflicts in the regions without necessarily seeking 
international assistance when crisp occurs. 
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Government of ECOWAS state should see to emphasize education 
beyond the four walls of the schools. Vocational training and other forms of 
skill acquisition development programmes should be made part of the 
national curriculum on human capital development. The high placing of 
emphasis on education in the class rooms has told more on the level of 
unemployment in these countries especially among the youths. 
Unemployment has been tested to have a positive response to fragility. 
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